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In a stochastic two-period OLG model, featuring an aggregate shock to the economy, ex-ante optimality requires 
intergenerational risk sharing. We compare the level of time-consistent intergenerational risk sharing chosen by a benevolent 
government and by an office-seeking politician. In our political system, the transfer of resources across generations is 
determined as a Markov equilibrium of a probabilistic voting game. Low realized returns on the risky asset induce politicians 
to compensate the old through a PAYG system. This political system typically generates an intergenerational risk sharing 
scheme that is (i) larger, (ii) more persistent, and (iii) less responsive to the realization of the shock than the (time consistent) 
social optimum. This is because the current politician anticipates her transfers to the elderly to be compensated by future 
politicians through offsetting transfers, and hence overspends. Aging increases the optimal transfer, but surprisingly makes 
office-seeking politicians more conservative, by increasing the cost for future politicians to compensate the current young. 
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In times of ﬁnancial troubles, public PAYG pension systems come back into fash-
ion. Large reductions in housing prices, losses in private pension funds, and
increased volatility in the stock market have large negative eﬀects on the private
wealth of the elderly — and ultimately on their consumption. Real annuities —
such as public pension beneﬁts — may instead guarantee stable old age consump-
tion, albeit typically at the cost of lower average returns on the contributions
paid during the working period. In other words, PAYG pension systems entail an
important intergenerational risk sharing component that proves crucial in periods
of high ﬁnancial instability.
This paper focuses on the role of the intergenerational risk sharing as a crucial
motivation for the existence of social security systems. We characterize the opti-
mal time-consistent risk sharing mechanism introduced by a benevolent govern-
ment that is unable commit to future policy, and compare it to the social security
system designed by oﬃce-seeking politicians, who choose this risk sharing policy in
order to win the elections — again in the absence of commitment on future policies.
We show that election-minded politicians typically prefer more spending in social
security and introduce more persistent policies. We then investigate the eﬀects of
population aging on these social security decisions. Surprisingly, politicians are
more conservative than a benevolent government in coping with aging.
Since early contributions by Enders and Lapan (1982) and Merton (1983),
PAYG social security systems have been recognized as an important instrument
of intergenerational risk sharing. The demand for risk sharing stems from the
uncertainty that is usually associated with endowments, wages and/or rate of
returns. Individuals would typically like to insure against bad realizations during
their lifetimes, before they are even born1. If there exists a long term player, such
as a benevolent government that can commit to carry out future policies on the
behalf of yet-to-be-born generations, intergenerational risk sharing may arise, e.g.,
through PAYG social security systems.
A parallel, but less sympathetic literature provides instead evidence on the
ineﬃciencies and the costs of the existing, generous social security systems. Large
reductions in the employment rate among middle aged and elderly workers, rising
labour cost, and the crowding out eﬀect on the stock of capital induced by the
1Even in a dynastic environment in which parents care about the well being of their kids,
and thus would like to purchase some insurance on their account, private markets may fail to
work, to the extent that legal contracts signed by the parents do not bind their oﬀsprings.
2reduction in private savings are only some of the by-products of these pension
systems, which have been largely criticized. The upshot of this literature is that
social security spending is ineﬃciently large.
Bohn (2003), and more recently Krueger and Kubler (2006), took a more
comprehensive approach, and consider both these costs and beneﬁts of PAYG
schemes. They suggest that the crowding out eﬀect on the private savings may
be so severe as to overweight the positive role of intergenerational risk sharing.
Storeletten et al. (1999) analyze the risk sharing properties of social security
systems vis-à-vis idiosyncratic risks, such as wage ﬂuctuations and mortality risk,
and reach similar conclusions. Clearly, additional considerations on the labor
market distortion induced by social security would only strengthen this argument.
Yet, in a more general setting, which — together with capital — features a long-lived
asset (such as land), Gottardi and Kubler (2006) provide more optimistic results
on the existence of a (ex-ante) Pareto improving social security system. Hence,
the jury is still out.
In this paper, we abstract from many distortionary aspects associated with
social security and concentrate on the intergenerational risk sharing property of
P A Y Gs y s t e m s .W es h o wt h a tb o t hab e n e v o l e n tg o v e r n m e n ta n da no ﬃce-seeking
politician have an incentive to introduce an unfunded system if a ﬁnancial market
crisis that wipes out the private wealth of the elderly occurs. This observation
is consistent with the experience of the US, where the introduction of the social
security system followed the 1929 stock market crash, and of several countries, such
as Belgium, France, Germany, and Italy, where episodes of hyperinﬂation wiped
out the value of the bonds issued in nominal terms and called for government’s
intervention to transform the existing (funded) systems into PAYG schemes (see
Flora, 1987).
We then turn to examine the main features of these risk sharing instruments,
and we ask whether electoral constraints may lead politicians to choose “too much”
social security spending, even in a setting in which social security entails no distor-
tions on labour supply or capital accumulation. In fact, we consider a stochastic
environment in which intergenerational risk sharing is (ex-ante) Pareto improving
and derive the optimal level of social security that a time consistent benevolent
government would choose. In our two-period stochastic overlapping generation
economy, the risk comes from an aggregate shock to the stock market, which af-
fects the net private wealth — and thus the consumption of the agents in their
old age. A benevolent government that cares about the well-being of current and
future generations determines a time consistent policy, after the realization of the
3shock to the economy. The (ad interim) optimal linear risk sharing policy features
a transfer typically from the young to the old, which depends negatively on the
realization of the net private wealth of the elderly.
To model the electoral incentives faced by the politicians, we consider a prob-
abilistic voting environment in which politicians choose the current social security
policy but are unable to commit to future transfers. This lack of commitment
would undermine intergenerational risk sharing, since young voters may not trust
to receive back a transfer in their old age. To capture the intertemporal link be-
tween current and future policies in absence of commitment, we concentrate on
Markov perfect equilibria of this probabilistic voting game, in which the equilib-
rium policy depends only on the state of the economy. In this political setting,
a PAYG system is introduced during an economic crisis, and persists in future
periods. Its size depends crucially on the electoral strength — as measured by
the relative share of swing (or undecided) voters among the elderly — of the old
generation, who happens to face the crisis. In other words, after a ﬁnancial crisis
oﬃce-seeking politicians are urged by their electoral constraints to “bail out” the
elderly through the provision of generous public pensions. The politicians’ incen-
tives to intervene in case of a negative shock eﬀectively create a quasi asset — the
PAYG social security — whose returns are negatively correlated to stock market
returns. Interestingly, this policy turns out to be quite persistent, since less dis-
posable income for the current young generation leads to lower net private wealth
in their old age and thus to more future government intervention.
We show that this political mechanism typically produces more intergener-
ational risk sharing than the (time consistent) social optimum. Overspending
stems from the strategic behavior of the politicians. They exploit the expecta-
tions by current young voters, who anticipate that their current transfers will be
compensated by oﬀsetting transfers provided by future politicians. This strategic
eﬀect lowers the electoral cost to the politicians. They hence have an incentive to
overspend in social security to please the current elderly voters. In other words,
politicians play strategically by “leaving” more risk sharing on the future gener-
ations than optimal. Furthermore, these transfers are more persistent and less
responsive to the realization of the shock than the optimal policy would require.
How do these oﬃce-seeking politicians react to population aging? The eﬀect
predicted by our model is quite surprising, given the results in the current litera-
ture on the political economy of social security2. Aging increases the transfers that
2See Razin, Sadka and Swagel (2002), Razin, Sadka and Swagel (2007), Disney (2007),
Galasso and Profeta (2007), and Simonovits (2007) for a recent symposium on this issue.
4a benevolent government would provide, but reduces the transfers chosen by the
oﬃce-seeking politicians; and makes the politicians less likely to overspend. This
novel result depends on the fact that aging makes it more costly for future politi-
cians to compensate the current young — and so reduces the room for strategic
behavior by the current politicians.
This paper relates to diﬀerent strands of the literature. Several contributions
have established important results on the Pareto optimal intergenerational risk
sharing properties of social security both ex-ante, i.e., behind a veil of ignorance,
and ad interim, that is, when the realization of one (or many) shock has occurred.
The structure of our economy is closely related to Gordon and Varian (1988).
Additional key contributions carried out in partial equilibrium framework include
Allen and Gale (1997), Shiller (1999), Demange (2002), Matsen and Thogersen
(2004) and Ball and Mankiw (2007). Instead Bohn (2003), Krueger and Kubler
(2006), Gottardi and Kubler (2006) and Olovsson (2004) consider also the general
equilibrium eﬀects arising from the introduction of a social security system, such
as the crowing out of the private savings.
Y e t ,t h ec l o s e rl i t e r a t u r ei sp e r h a p st h eo n eo nt h ep o l i t i c a ls u p p o r tf o ri n t e r -
generational risk sharing. As Orszag and Stiglitz (2001, see myth 9), we in fact
recognize that, if a negative shock occurs, oﬃce-seeking politicians may decide to
“bail out” the elderly. Rangel and Zeckhauser (2001) present several arguments
suggesting that neither the market nor politicians are typically able to provide the
optimal level of intergenerational risk sharing. Our political environment is similar
to Gonzales-Eiras and Niepelt (2008), who study the eﬀect of demographic tran-
sition on Markov equilibrium social security transfers using a probabilistic voting
model3. In the presence of demographic risks, but no uncertainty on the assets’
returns, their political equilibrium features some degree of intergenerational risk
sharing, which they compare to the Ramsey allocation (i.e., with commitment).
Our contribution considers instead uncertainty in the ﬁnancial markets and focuses
on time consistent policies. Finally, Demange (2007) characterizes the conditions
for a PAYG social security system to have political support in absence of commit-
ment on future policies. She ﬁnds that — besides the redistributive elements often
embedded in these pension systems — political support depends on the degree of
risk aversion of the decisive voter and on the availability of ﬁnancial assets. Our
results are in line with her sustainability conditions. In addition, we are able
3Political environments that combine probabilitisc voting and Markov perfect equilibrium
are also in Hassler et al. (2003 and 2007) and Song (2008) among others. For time consistent
policies chosen by a benevolent government see Klein et al. (2008) and references therein.
5to characterize and to compare the risk sharing policy chosen by a benevolent
government and by the politicians.
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 describes the model and the ex-ante
Pareto improving role of intergenerational risk sharing. Section 3 and 4 analyze
respectively the time consistent policy chosen by a benevolent government, who
cares about the current and future generations, and by oﬃce-seeking politicians
in a probabilistic voting model. Section 5 compares these results and provides
some comparative statics. Section 6 analyzes how the aging process aﬀects these
choices. Section 7 concludes. All the proofs are in the appendix.
2. A Simple Stochastic Economy
We consider a two period overlapping generations model of a small open econ-
omy. Every period two generations are alive: young and old. Population grows
at a constant rate n. Agents are endowed with one unit of labor in youth, which
they supply inelastically to receive a wage, w.A g e n t se v a l u a t eo l da g ec o n s u m p -





,w i t h
U
0 (.) > 0, U
00 (.) < 0,w h e r ect
t+1 represents consumption at time t+1, i.e., in old
age, by an agent born at time t.
Output in the economy is given by
yt = wLt + RtKt (2.1)
where Kt represents the stock of capital, i.e., the amount of savings, in the econ-
omy. Capital fully depreciates at every period. The return on capital is stochastic.
Claims to capital represent the only (risky) asset in this economy, which pays a
real return Rt distributed according to a cumulative function G(Rt),w i t hm e a n
E[Rt]=R,v a r i a n c eVa r[Rt]=σ2 and no serial correlation E(RtRt+1)=R2.
Limited liability applies in the stock market to the risky asset, which also features
an upper bound ¯ R on its returns, Rt ∈ [0, ¯ R] ∀t. The wage is deterministic and
assumed to be unitary, w =1 .
The distribution of the stochastic returns represents a crucial element in a
model that analyzes intertemporal risk sharing. Instead of recurring to a speciﬁc
distribution function, we choose to consider distributions that obey to two criteria.
First, we assume that the average return from the risky asset is higher that the
return from a PAYG social security system, R>1+n. Second, we assume that
the distribution is rather spread out, so that the coeﬃcient of variation, σ/R,i s
6greater than one. Thus,we have the following assumption.
Assumption 1 σ>R>(1 + n).
Agents save their entire net endowment for old age consumption using the
risky asset, so the budget constraint of an individual born at time t is
ct+1 = Rt+1 (1 − Tt)+Pt+1 (2.2)
where Tt (< 1) i st h ea m o u n to ft a x e sp a i db yt h ey oung, which is used to provide
a transfer to the current old — as in a PAYG social security system, and Pt =
(1 + n)Tt is the amount received by the old. It is also convenient to deﬁne the
net private wealth of the elderly at time t +1as ωt+1 = Rt+1 (1 − Tt).
In most of the paper, agents are assumed to have quadratic preferences, which






where the parameter γ plays a double role. In the deterministic formulation that
applies to the consumption of the elderly, once the shock is realized, γ determines
the marginal utility of consumption. In the expected utility formulation that
applies instead to the young, the parameter γ measures the degree of risk aversion:
al o w e rγ characterizes a more risk averse individual.
For this utility function to feature positive marginal utility, we need to have
that γ>c t ∀t.As u ﬃcient condition is that γ>¯ R +( 1+n). This amounts to
require that the marginal utility of consumption is positive even when individuals
pay no contributions in youth, obtain the largest possible return, ¯ R,f r o mt h e i r
savings — consisting on their entire labor income — and receive the largest possible
pension transfer, Pt+1 =( 1+n),i no l da g e 4.W ec h o o s et oi m p o s ea na d d i t i o n a l
restriction on γ to guarantee that a policy consisting of a positive contribution
rate imposed on the young at time t, with no corresponding pension beneﬁta t
t +1 , is associated with a negative expected marginal utility for the young. This
occurs for γ>S / Rwhere S = σ2 +R2. We thus have our next two assumptions.
4In what follows, we will allow the benevolent government and the politicians to choose a
negative transfer — that is, a transfer of resources from the elderly to the young — at least for some
realization of the shock. If this occurs, the savings of the young may exceed their labor income.
However, it is straightforward to show that the consumption level implied by the equilibrium
policy chosen by the benevolent government and the politicians (see sections 3 and 4) never
exceeds R+(1+n).T h es u ﬃcient condition at assumption 2 hence holds also for the following
sections.
7Assumption 2 γ>¯ R +( 1+n).
Assumption 3 γ>S / R .
Notice that in this economy, in absence of a social security system, consump-
tion in old age is simply equal to the realization of the return on the risky
asset: ct+1 = Rt+1. Hence, the expected consumption at time t corresponds
to the average return Et[ct+1]=Et[Rt+1]=R, and similarly for the variance
Va r t[ct+1]=Va r t[Rt+1]=σ2.C l e a r l y , t h e c o e ﬃcient of variation for the con-
sumption is σ/R > 1.
2.1. Ex-Ante Pareto Eﬃcient Intergenerational Risk Sharing
In this simple economic setting, individuals have no mechanism to ensure against
the risk of a negative stock market shock. In absence of intergenerational transfers,
a low realization of the return on their assets aﬀects their private wealth and hence
their consumption. Agents may hence be willing to incur in a tax on their labor
supply when young in order to receive a transfer from the next generation of
individuals when old. As a simple benchmark to discuss ex-ante Pareto eﬃciency,
consider the decision of a young generation that uses a constant intergenerational
transfer scheme to maximize its expected utility. In other words, we assume the
existence of a commitment device that allows the young to set up a PAYG pension
system by contributing a share, α, of their labor income today in exchange for the
same share of the young labor income in the next period. As largely discussed
in the literature, in order for this arrangement to arise, some long term player —







Et (ct+1 − γ)
2 (2.4)
ct+1 = Rt+1 (1 − α)+α(1 + n)
As the following ﬁrst order condition shows, this amounts to a simple portfolio
d e c i s i o np r o b l e mi nw h i c ht h ea g e n t sh a v et oc h o o s eh o wt od i v i d et h e i rs a v i n g
between a safe asset that provides a return (1 + n), and a risky asset with a
stochastic return Rt+1:
Et (ct+1 − γ)(Rt+1 − (1 + n)) = 0 (2.5)
8T h es h a r eo fs a v i n g sa l l o c a t e dt ot h eintergenerational risk sharing is
α =
σ2 +( R − (1 + n))(R − γ)
σ2 +( R − (1 + n))
2 .
Depending on their degree of risk aversion, the young may choose some inter-





R−(1+n) ,w h e r eS = σ2 + R2.T oc o n s i d e ra ne n v i -





How does consumption in old age evolves in the presence of this intergenera-
tional risk sharing transfer? The expected consumption at time t is thus equal to
Et[ct+1]=R − α(R − (1 + n)).F o rα>0,t h i si sl o w e rt h a nt h ee x p e c t e dc o n -
sumption in absence of risk sharing, Et[ct+1] <R . Yet, also the variance decreases,
Va r t[ct+1]=( 1− α)
2 σ2 <σ 2. Finally, it is easy to see that the coeﬃcient of vari-
ation for the consumption is lower with this risk sharing device than in absence
of risk sharing.
To summarize, in this simple economic environment, even an uncontingent,
constant policy can be ex-ante Pareto improving, if individuals are suﬃciently
risk averse5. This constant policy however rests on the assumption that current
individuals can commit to future policies. In the remaining of the paper, we
will allow for more complex policies, which relate the degree of risk sharing to
the realization of the shock, but will drop the assumption of commitment. In
choosing the intergenerational policies, a benevolent government and the oﬃce-
seeking politicians will have to consider that future policies cannot be committed
upon; quite on the opposite, they can be modiﬁed at any time, if convenient.
3. Intergenerational Risk Sharing by a Benevolent Govern-
ment
In this section, we consider the intergenerational risk sharing decision of a benev-
olent government which cares about the well being of current and future gen-
erations, and has to choose a time consistent policy. In every period, after the
5It is worth noticing that assumption 4 is always consistent with assumption 3 and is com-
patible with assumption 2 for distribution functions that have a suﬃciently high variance, that
is, if σ2 > (R − (1 + n))
¡
R − R +( 1+n)
¢
.
9realization of the shock has occurred, and hence the net private wealth of the
elderly has become known, a benevolent government decides whether to transfer
resources from the young to the elderly (or viceversa). We assume no commitment,
so that the policy can be modiﬁed over time, if it is optimal to do so6.




U (ct)+δ(1 + n)EtU (ct+1)+δ
2 (1 + n)
2 EtU (ct+2)+.... (3.1)
subject to the budget constraint at eq. 2.2, where δ<1/(1 + n) represents the
benevolent government’s discount rate, and the utility function is at eq. 2.3. Indi-
vidual agents take no economic decisions, while the government decision variable
is the policy, Tt.T h es t a t ev a r i a b l ei sωt = Rt (1 − Tt−1), which characterizes the




{U (ωt,T t)+δ(1 + n)EtV (ωt+1)}. (3.2)
The ﬁrst order condition of this optimization problem is:
−(ωt +( 1+n)T (ωt) − γ)+δEt (ωt+1 +( 1+n)T (ωt+1) − γ)Rt+1 =0 . (3.3)
The former term represents the marginal utility for the elderly of an increase
in their consumption due to the intergenerational transfer, whereas the latter rep-
resents the reduction in marginal utility for the young from lower future consump-
tion. To solve this optimization problem, we guess a linear time consistent policy,
T (ωt)=A + Bωt,a n dv e r i f yt h a ti ts a t i s ﬁes eq. 3.3. Recall that S = σ2 + R2.
The next proposition characterizes the optimal interior time-consistent linear pol-
icy function.






, there exists a time-consistent linear policy
function TG (ωt)=A + Bωt, that solves the benevolent government problem at
6For time consistent policies chosen by a benevolent government in a more general, yet
deterministic, environment in which individuals take savings (and labor) decisions, see Klein et
al. (2008).





δ[S − Rγ]+( γ − (1 + n))
δ[S − R(1 + n)]
This proposition suggests that if a benevolent government cares suﬃciently
about the future generations, i.e., if δ ∈ Λ, it will implement a linear interior
intergenerational risk sharing mechanism, which provides to the elderly a transfer
consisting of a constant share, A, which is reduced of a proportion B according to
the realization of the state of the world, ω.I nt h ew o r s tc a s es c e n a r i o ,i nw h i c h
the elderly have zero private wealth, ωi =0— for instance because of a very bad
stock market shock, Ri =0— the benevolent government imposes a positive, large
transfer on the young, TG(ωi)=A ∈ (0,1). Better realizations of the rate of
return, and hence higher private wealth for the elderly, are associated with lower
transfers from the young.
Clearly, a lower weight on the future generations, i.e., δ<1/R,m a yl e a d ,i nt h e
occurrence of a particularly negative shock on the returns, to a complete transfer
of resources from the young to the elderly, TG(ωi)=1 . These equilibria with full
expropriation have the unpleasant feature of representing an absorbing state. In
fact, the young generation on which a 100% tax rate is imposed reaches old age
with zero private wealth, ω =0 , which will in turn command a 100% tax rate on
the young and so on. In the remaining of the paper, we will disregard these full
expropriation equilibria and concentrate on interior equilibrium solution, thereby
assuming that δ>1/R. On the contrary, an extremely large weight on the future
generations could lead to a transfer from the old to the young even in the worst
case scenario, in which ω =0 . In the appendix, we show that for δ<1/(1 + n),
this does not occur. The next proposition further characterizes this interior-
equilibrium risk sharing policy by presenting the results of some comparative
statics.
Proposition 3.2. For δ ∈ Λ,a ni n c r e a s ei n( i )t h ed i s c o u n tf a c t o r ,δ; or in (ii)
average rate of return, R, reduces the ﬁxed component, A, of the time-consistent
linear policy function TG (ωt), and makes the transfer less responsive to the shock.
An increase in the variance of the shock, σ2, increases the time-consistent linear
policy function TG(ωt).
11The intuition is straightforward. Recall that for any given realization of the
shock, providing a transfer to the current elderly comes at the cost of lower ex-
pected utility for the young generations, because of the opportunity cost of using
a PAYG system for risk sharing — given that R>1+n. Hence, the higher the
weight placed on these future generations, or the higher the average return of the
risky asset — and hence the opportunity cost — the lower the ﬁxed component of
the transfer, which becomes also ﬂatter. On the other hand, higher volatility of
the returns clearly requires more risk sharing, and hence TG(ωt) increases.
4. Intergenerational Risk Sharing by Oﬃce-seeking Politi-
cians
In the political system, intergenerational risk sharing may arise because oﬃce-
seeking politicians choose to transfer resources from the young to the old (or
viceversa) in order to improve their electoral perspective. Politicians act after the
stock market shock has occurred — and hence the return on the risky asset, Rt,i s
realized.
Formally, we consider a probabilistic voting model. Two political candidates
compete in a majoritarian election. Each candidate determines her political plat-
form, which is represented by the contribution, T, in order to maximize her prob-
ability of winning the election. The candidate who wins the election becomes the
policy-maker, and implements the proposed policy. Elections take place every
period, after the realization of the stochastic return on the assets of the current
old. Hence, political candidates can condition their intergenerational risk sharing
policy on the realized state of the world.
At every election, individual’s voting decisions depend on the policy chosen by
the political candidates — and thus on how this aﬀects their utility, on the individ-
ual’s political ideology towards the two candidates, and on a common popularity
shock that may hit the candidates before the election. Political candidates will
use the intergenerational risk sharing policy to target the young and/or the old, in
an attempt to increase their probability of winning the election, but they cannot
aﬀect the voters’ ideology or their own popularity. Within each age group, all in-
dividuals share the same economic preferences, thereby being equally aﬀected by
the candidates’ platforms. Elderly care only about the current transfer. Instead,
the preferences of the current young — and thus their voting behavior — depend
also on the expected future policy. If the young were myopic, they would only
consider the direct eﬀect of the current payroll tax on their savings and thereby
12on their future consumption. Young workers however realize that a current tax
makes them more likely to be poorer tomorrow, and this may modify the future
politicians’ behavior. Current young electors hence need to understand and eval-
uate how the decisions of the current politicians may aﬀect the future politicians’
policy choice. We choose to consider a Markov policy, in which intergenerational
risk sharing transfers depend only on the current state of the economy, in order
to emphasize the absence of commitment to future policies by the politicians.
This also justiﬁes our previous decision of concentrating on time consistent policy
determined by a benevolent government (see section 2).
Besides the utility provided by the economic policy, individuals care also about
the political ideology, with some people feeling ideologically closer to one candi-
date or another. The distribution of ideology within each age group aﬀects the
candidate policy decision by determining the size of the swing voters, i.e., of the
non-ideological voters who can be convinced to vote for a candidate if targeted
with the appropriate policy. It is convenient to assume that each age group has a
uniform distribution of ideology across agents.
In this environment, the two political candidates face the same optimization
problem, and thus their political platforms converge, i.e. both candidates choose
the same contribution, T (see Persson and Tabellini, 2000, and Hassler et al., 2003,
for a framework with dynamic voting). Maximizing the probability of winning the
election at time t is equivalent to maximizing the following expression, which may
also be interpreted as the welfare function of the policy-maker at time t:
Wt = φoU (ct)+( 1+n)φyEtU (ct+1) (4.1)
where φo and φy represent the density of the uniform ideology distribution function
in the two groups, respectively old and young. We normalize φo =1and deﬁne
φ = φy ≥ 0 as the relative importance of non-ideological, or swing, voters among
the young generation. This can be interpreted as a measure of how ﬁercely the
young generations pursue their interests in the political arena.
Eq. 4.1 shows that political competition, as modelled in this probabilistic
voting framework, entails a trade oﬀ between providing state contingent trans-
fers (and utility) to current retirees and providing current negative transfers, but
expected positive transfers (and utility), to current workers. Hence, the voting
behavior of the young depends on the policy chosen by the current politician, as
well as on its impact on tomorrow’s policy. To model this intertemporal link, we
focus on stationary Markov perfect equilibria, in which each politician’s policy
decision is contingent on the current state of the economy. At any time t,t h e
13state variable is the amount of old age consumption that can be ﬁnanced out of
the private assets ωt. This clearly depends on the young’ savings (or net income)
and on the outcome of the stock market. Thus, past policies directly contribute to
deﬁning the state of the economy. Clearly, each politician anticipates that its cur-
rent choice will aﬀect the incentive faced by the future politicians and, therefore,
the future level of the intergenerational risk sharing.
The optimization problem of a policy-maker at time t is thus
Max
{−ω≤T(ω)≤1}
U (ct)+φ(1 + n)EtU (ct+1) (4.2)
where the Markov strategy is Tt = T(ωt), the state variable is deﬁned as ωt =
Rt (1 − Tt−1). Consumption can be written as ct = ωt +( 1+n)T(ωt).N o t i c e
that ct+1 = Rt+1 (1 − Tt)+(1+n)Tt+1 where Tt+1 is the expected strategy played
by future governments.
We can now formally deﬁne the linear Markov policy analyzed in this section.
Deﬁnition 4.1. A policy TP(ω)=θ + T0ω,w h e r eθ and T0 =
∂TP(ωt+1)
∂ωt+1 are con-
stant parameters, is a linear Markov perfect equilibrium of the intergenerational
risk sharing game if it is a ﬁxed point of the mapping from Te(.) to TP(.),w h e r e
Te(.) is the expected policy function, TP(ωt) ∈ argmax
T(ωt)
U (ωt +( 1+n)T(.)) +
φ(1 + n)EtU ((1 − T(ωt)Rt+1 +( 1+n)Te(ωt+1)) and TP(ωt)=Te(ωt).
In what follows, we will characterize this equilibrium policy outcome for any
well behaved utility function with U0 > 0 and U00 < 0. We will return to the
quadratic utility function later in this section.






where — for TP
t > 0 — the former term represents the marginal utility of increasing
the consumption of the current old, while the latter deﬁnes the expected mar-
ginal disutility to the current young from imposing this risk sharing policy. This
















∂ωt+1 = T0.T h e ﬁrst order condition of the maximization
problem at eq. 4.2 becomes:
U
0 (ct) − φ[1 + (1 + n)T
0]EtU
0 (ct+1)Rt+1 =0 . (4.4)
Thus, if an interior Markov equilibrium policy TP(ωt) e x i s t s ,i tm u s ts a t i s f y
−1/(1 + n) <T 0(ωt) ≤ 0. The above equation provides a ﬁrst insight on this
political intergenerational risk sharing. This policy is shaped by the political trade
oﬀ between bailing out the current old from negative stock market shocks and
imposing an expected cost on current young. In an interior Markov equilibrium,
the intergenerational risk sharing agreement7 features a transfer from the young
to the old that is inversely related to the outcome of the stock market. It is
important to notice that the political discretion by policy-makers in setting an
intergenerational transfer policy creates a quasi-asset, whose returns are negatively
correlated to stock market returns. Furthermore, by increasing TP, the current
politician reduces, for any future realization of the stock market Rt+1,t h el e v e lo f
private wealth of the current young, thereby requiring larger future intervention.
This property creates a strategic eﬀect that induces persistence in the policy. In
this model, a large current political intervention creates its own constituency for
future large political interventions. Although this is commonly thought as the
root of the persistence of ineﬃcient policies (see Coate and Morris, 1999, and
Conde-Ruiz and Galasso, 2003), in our context the tension between persistence
and eﬃcient allocation of risk is more subtle. The essence of intergenerational risk
sharing is to spread current shocks on to future generations (see also Gordon and
Varian, 1988), i.e., persistence is a crucial ingredient of an eﬃcient risk sharing
policy. By transferring the burden of current negative shock to current workers,
the politician triggers a reaction by all future politicians, who keep transferring
this shock into the inﬁnite future.
To obtain further insights on the intergenerational risk sharing policy chosen
7The structure of the problem faced by these oﬃce-seeking politicians resambles the problem
of optimal bequests strategies in altruistic economies where the current generation cares about
the utilities of their immediate successors (see Phelps and Pollak, 1968, Bernheim and Ray, 1989,
and, more recently, Nowak, 2006, and references therein). The main diﬀerence is that in our
political environment the weight on diﬀerent generations depends on the relative share of non
ideological (swing) voters in each age group; whereas in the former class of models the relative
weight between (state contingent) utility to ancestors and expected utility to descendants is
dictated by altruism and other ethical considerations.
15by oﬃce-seeking politicians, we continue our analysis using the quadratic utility
function described at eq. 2.3. The ﬁrst order condition of the maximization
problem at eq. 4.2, which describes the stationary Markov policy chosen by the
politician a time t, becomes:
−[ωt+(1 + n)T




subject to the linear policy TP(ω)=θ +T0ω. The next proposition characterizes
the optimal linear policy function.







, there exists a linear
Markov perfect policy function TP (ωt)=θ + T0ωt,w i t hTP (ω) < 1 ∀ω,a n d





























This proposition characterizes the behavior of the sequence of oﬃce-seeking
politicians under a Markov perfect equilibrium when individual preferences have
a mean-variance representation. Analogously to the benevolent government case,
the conditions on φ makes sure that the young generation has suﬃcient relative
electoral weight to avoid equilibrium sequences featuring full expropriation of the
young, in the occurrence of negative stock market shocks. Also in this case, in
fact, full expropriation would become an absorbing state, since it would lead the
y o u n gt oh a v ez e r op r i v a t ew e a l t hi no l da g e ,ω =0, and thus trigger further full
expropriation by future generations.
For a higher electoral weight of the young, oﬃce-seeking politicians will still
introduce a linear intergenerational risk sharing scheme, featuring a positive con-
stant component, θ,w h i c hi sr e d u c e db yas h a r eT0 according to the realization
of the state of the world, ω. In the worst case scenario, ω =0 , the elderly obtain
the largest transfer TP(ω)=θ ∈ (0,1). Higher levels of private wealth, ω,c o m -
mand lower transfers. Finally, if the relative electoral weight of the young is large
enough, that is, if φ is above the upper limit of Φ, politicians would refrain from
16introducing a (PAYG) intergenerational risk sharing system, even when the worst
case, ω =0 , occurs.
The next proposition provides some results on the comparative statics.
Proposition 4.3. For φ ∈ Φ,a ni n c r e a s ei nt h ea v e r a g er a t eo fr e t u r n ,R,o ri n
political weight of the young, φ,m o d i ﬁes the time-consistent linear policy function
TP(ω)=θ + T0ω by decreasing its ﬁxed component θ and by making it less
responsive to the realization of the state variable, ω.
The intuition is straightforward. A lower average return reduces the (oppor-
tunity) cost — recall that R>1+n —o fu s i n gaP A Y Gs y s t e mt op r o v i d er i s k
sharing, while a decrease in the political weight of the young, φ, increases the
electoral cost of introducing risk sharing. In both cases, the ﬁxed component of
the system thus shrinks, and the system becomes less responsive to the shocks.
In other words, the young prefer less risk sharing with a ﬂatter schedule.
5. How well do politicians do?
Both oﬃce-seeking politicians and a benevolent government would provide in-
tergenerational risk sharing in the stochastic environment introduced at section
2. Moreover, their linear time-consistent equilibrium policies share similar prop-
erties. As characterized at propositions 3.1 and 4.2, both policies consist of a
constant component (A for a benevolent government and θ for the politicians),
which is transferred to the elderly in the worst case scenario, i.e., for ω =0 ,a n d
of a proportion — respectively B and T0 — which reduces the maximum transfer in
accordance to the realization of the state variable ω. Propositions 3.2 and 4.3 push
these similarities even further, as they suggest that the steady state properties of
the two policy functions are comparable.
We now examine under which conditions oﬃce-seeking politicians behave ex-
actly as a benevolent government. In other words, when is the interior linear
Markov equilibrium policy chosen by politicians aiming to be elected optimal?
The next proposition characterizes when the interior linear Markov equilibrium
policy TP(ω) coincides with the time consistent optimum, TG(ω).A g r a p h i c
representation is at ﬁgure 1.





linear Markov equilibrium policy chosen by oﬃce-seeking politicians correspond
17to the time consistent optimum, i.e., TP(ω)=TG(ω) ∀ω.F o rφ<f(δ), TP(ω) >
TG(ω) ∀ω,w i t hT0 >Band θ>A .F o r φ>f(δ), TP(ω) <T G(ω) ∀ω,w i t h
T0 <Band θ<A .
According to this proposition, in a Markov game among successive generations
of oﬃce-seeking politicians deliver the (time consistent) optimum if the relative
electoral weight of the young is larger than the weight assigned by a benevolent
government to the future generations. In fact, for equal weights, i.e., for φ = δ,
oﬃce-seeking politicians will provide more transfer than the social optimum. This
transfer is characterized by a larger than optimal ﬁxed component, θ>A ;a n d
by a lower than optimal reduction associated to the state of nature, T0 >B .
In other words, political intergenerational risk sharing policy is too generous,
and too persistent, that is, not enough responsive to the state variable. These
distortions come from the politicians’ strategic behavior. In fact, in their decisions
over the transfer policy, current politicians anticipate that future politicians will
compensate the current young in their old age for their current social security
contributions. This stems from the fact that higher taxes on today environment
lead to a lower private wealth in old age — that is, to a lower state variable in
the following period — thereby triggering more transfers by the future politicians.
The policy response of the future politicians thus reduces the current (electoral)
cost of transferring resources to the elderly and leads to overspending — unless the
young enjoy an unusually large political power, i.e., φ>f(δ).
These two intergenerational risk sharing policies have diﬀerent implications
for the consumption in old age. In both cases, old age consumption depends
on the realization of the shock to the returns of the risky assets. However, for
φ<f(δ), that is, when the politicians are more generous than optimal in their
risk sharing policy, they guarantee a higher than optimal expected consumption
in old age, but at the cost of introducing also a higher than optimal variance of
consumption. By transferring too much resources to old age, and by failing to
have these transfers depending more on the realization of the state variable, the
politicians fail to provide the optimal risk sharing policy.
6. Aging
One of the most severe challenges for the public social security systems in devel-
oped economies is given by population aging. Aging decreases the returns from
a PAYG system — thereby requiring either a reduction in pension beneﬁts or an
18increase in contribution rates (or both), or alternative policy measures, such as
a raise in the retirement age. Besides these economic eﬀects, aging has also an
important political eﬀect. As suggested in a recent political economy literature,
electoral constraints become more binding under aging, since elderly individuals,
who are highly supportive of pension systems, are increasingly more relevant in
the electorate (see references in footnote 2).
How does aging aﬀect the functioning of a PAYG pension system designed
by a benevolent government to achieve intergenerational risk sharing? And how
does aging aﬀect the pension policy decisions of politicians who face electoral
constraints? The next proposition summarizes the results for both a benevolent
government and the politicians.
Proposition 6.1. For δ ∈ Λ and φ ∈ Φ, population aging, i.e., a reduction in n,
increases the time-consistent linear policy transfer chosen by a benevolent govern-
ment, TG (ωt).F o rTP (ωt) >T G (ωt), aging tilts the linear Markov equilibrium
policy transfer chosen by oﬃce-seeking politicians, by reducing the ﬁxed compo-
nent, θ, and the responsiveness to the shocks. Moreover, population aging reduces





These results are quite surprising. In an intergenerational risk sharing frame-
work, aging increases the cost of using the main risk sharing instrument — the
PAYG pension system; but it also increases the relative importance of the cur-
rent generation of elderly both to a benevolent government and to oﬃce-seeking
politicians. For the benevolent government, the latter eﬀect dominates, and thus
aging leads to higher transfers. Surprisingly, for TP (ωt) >T G(ωt), that is, when
pension transfers are already very generous — politicians display a more conserv-
ative behavior. Aging reduces the transfer level, θ, provided to the elderly in the
worst case scenario, i.e., for ω =0 , but it also decreases the responsiveness to the
shocks — that is, in good time the transfer level is reduced by a lower amount.
Aging thus aﬀects the time-consistent (interior) linear intergenerational policy
chosen by a benevolent government and by oﬃce-seeking politicians in opposite di-
rection. As a result, aging has also an eﬀect on the comparison between the choices
by a benevolent government and by the politicians analyzed at Proposition 5.1.





which characterizes the equivalence between the benevolent government and the
politicians’ decision. Politicians thus become less likely to “overspend” — that is,
the range of parameters over which they provide more transfers than optimal is
reduced. This, perhaps surprising, result stems from the fact that aging increases
19the cost of large current transfers in terms of tomorrow’s adjustments. In other
words, it becomes more costly for current politicians to provide “too much” risk
sharing, since the PAYG system is less eﬃcient and future politicians will become
less keen on accommodating the previous policies with provision of large transfers.
Unlike most of the results in the current political economy literature, Proposition
6.1 thus suggests that aging will limit social security spending by reducing the
room for the politicians’ strategic behavior.
7. Concluding Remarks
The risk sharing properties of social security have long been recognized in the
literature. In several stochastic environments, individuals would beneﬁtf r o m
insuring against aggregate shocks before they are even born. Clearly, this is not
possible. Yet, once they are born — and uncertainty is realized, there is no more
room for risk sharing. Establishing a PAYG system thus seems to require the
existence of a long term player, who can bind future, yet-to-be-born generations
to carry out the risk sharing policy.
In absence of commitment, we show that a benevolent government and oﬃce-
seeking politicians choose to adopt a state contingent social security system. The
amount of resources transferred to the elderly by the working generation depends
negatively on the elderly private wealth — and therefore on the realization of the
aggregate shock to the returns of the risk asset. This state contingent social
security thus constitutes a quasi asset, whose returns are negatively related to the
market returns. This result is in line with Ball and Mankiw (2007) who propose
an optimal intergenerational risk sharing plan with a negative correlation between
social security beneﬁts and asset returns.
However, the intergenerational risk sharing schemes proposed by a benevolent
government and by the politicians may diﬀer. Oﬃce-seeking politicians are more
likely to provide generous transfers that are less responsive to the aggregate shock,
and hence more persistent. While persistence is typically at the root of eﬃcient
intergenerational risk sharing policies, since it allows to spread the risk over time
and hence over several generations, oﬃce-seeking politicians have an incentive to
overplay this feature. In fact, politicians are willing to tax more heavily current
workers and to provide generous transfers to the current elderly, because they
anticipate that future politicians — facing elderly individuals with low net wealth,
due to the large contributions they had to pay in their youth — will compensate
them with generous pension transfers. This mechanism thus reduces the electoral
20cost among the young voters of providing large transfers and leads to generous,
persistent pension systems. This result is consistent with Bohn (2003) ﬁndings
that the current US social security system does not provide the optimal level of
r i s ks h a r i n g ,s i n c ei ti st o og e n e r o u sw i t ht h ee l d e r l ya n ds h i f t sm o s to ft h eb u r d e n
of risk sharing on to future generations.
Perhaps surprisingly, our model suggests that the aging process needs not to
exacerbate the generous treatment that oﬃce-seeking politicians provide to the
elderly. In fact, due to population aging, electoral-minded politicians will indeed
become less likely to “overspend”. This is because aging makes the strategic
behavior by current oﬃce-seeking politicians more costly. In fact, aging reduces
the return from social security, and hence the amount of transfers that future
politicians will be willing to provide to elderly individuals with low net wealth —
thereby increasing the electoral cost for the current politicians of higher transfers.
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24Appendix
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 . 1
Consider the optimization problem of the benevolent government at eq. 3.1.









where ωt = Rt (1 − Tt−1) deﬁn e st h es t a t ev a r i a b l ea tt i m et. Using the utility
function at eq. 2.3, the above expression can be written as eq. 3.3. To solve for
interior equilibrium policies, we guess a linear solution: TG(ωt)=A+Bωt.U s i n g




1+n + δS(1 + B (1 + n))
+
γ (1 − δR)+δS(1 + B (1 + n)) − δ (1 + n)AR





1+n + δS(1 + B (1 + n))
(7.1)
A =
γ (1 − δR)+δS(1 + B (1 + n)) − δ(1 + n)AR
1+n + δS(1 + B (1 + n))
(7.2)






γ − (1 + n)+δ(S − γR)
δ(S − (1 + n)R)
(7.4)
Recall that we restrict the analysis to interior equilibrium policies that do not
feature full expropriation for any value of the state variable, that is, TG(ω) < 1
∀ω. To guarantee that this condition holds, we need to impose TG(ω) < 1 for
ω =0 , i.e., A<1.S i m p l e a l g e b r a y i e l d s δ>1/R. Additionally, we require
some risk sharing to take place, and thus a transfer from the young to the old to
occur at least in some state. The most favorable case for this transfer to occur
is for ω =0 . We hence need to have A>0. Simple algebra shows that, since
γ>S / R(assumption 3), this occurs for δ<
γ−(1+n)











25P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 . 2
For δ ∈ Λ, recall that the time-consistent linear policy function is TG (ωt)=
A + Bωt with A and B deﬁned in proposition 3.1.
(i) consider a change in the discount factor, δ. Simple algebra shows that
∂B
∂δ = 1




(ii) consider a change in the average rate of return, R. W eh a v et h a t∂B
∂R =
2R
δS2 > 0 and ∂A
∂R = −
(γ−(1+n))[δ(σ2−R2)+2R−(1+n)]
δ(S−(1+n)R)2 < 0,s i n c eσ2 >R 2 (assumption
1).
Finally, (iii) consider a change in the variance of the shock, σ2.I ti se a s yt o
see that ∂B
∂σ2 = 1
δS2 > 0 and ∂A
∂σ2 =
(δR−1)[γ−(1+n)]
δ(S−(1+n)R)2 > 0. Hence,
∂TG(ω)
∂σ2 > 0. Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 . 2
Consider the ﬁrst order condition at eq. 4.5, which describes the stationary
Markov policy chosen by the politician a time t. Recall that the state variable is





∀t,a n dt h a tTP(ωt)=θ + T0ωt.M o r e o v e r ,d e ﬁne
Q =1+( 1 + n)T0. We need to obtain the value of the parameters T0 and θ,





1+n + φSQ2 +
γ + φSQ2 − φQR(γ − θ(1 + n))





1+n + φSQ2 (7.5)
θ =
γ + φSQ2 − φQR(γ − θ(1 + n))
1+n + φSQ2 (7.6)




























26Recall that we restrict the analysis to interior equilibrium policies that do not
feature full expropriation for any value of the state variable, ω.T h a ti s ,w er e q u i r e
TP(ω) < 1 ∀ω. To guarantee this condition for these two candidate solutions of
T0,w en e e dt oi m p o s et h eﬁrst order condition of the politicians (see eq. 4.5)
evaluated at ω =0to be negative when T =1. Substituting ω =0and T =1in
eq. 4.5, and imposing the expression to be negative yields the following inequality:
φ(1 + (1 + n)T
0)R<1 (7.9)
Let’s begin investigating the candidate solution T0 = T0
A. Substituting T0
A in







Clearly, for φ<2/R, the above inequality is not satisﬁed, and thus T0
A is not part
of an interior equilibrium solution. For φ>2/R, we can elaborate on the above
expression to obtain the following inequality: φ>
S/R
S−R(1+n). Simple algebra shows
that for σ2/R2 > 1 (see assumption 1), this inequality cannot hold for φ>2/R.
Hence, candidate solution T0 = T0
A cannot be part of an interior equilibrium
solution.
Let’s now turn to the candidate solution T0 = T0
B. Substituting T0
B in eq. 7.9






> 2 − φR.
Clearly, for φ>2/R, the above inequality is always satisﬁed, and thus T0
B can
be part of an interior equilibrium solution. For φ<2/R, the above inequality
c a nb er e w r i t t e na sφ>
S/R
S−R(1+n). Notice that for σ2/R2 > 1 (see assumption
1)
S/R
S−R(1+n) < 2/R. Hence, candidate solution T0 = T0
B is part of an interior
equilibrium solution if φ>
S/R
S−R(1+n).
With T0 = T0
B, we can now solve the expression at eq. 7.6 for θ. Simple algebra

















Recall that we restrict the analysis to interior equilibrium policies that do
not feature full expropriation for any value of the state variable, ω.T h a t i s ,
27we require TP(ω) < 1 ∀ω. To guarantee that this condition holds, we need to
impose TP(ω) < 1 for ω =0 , i.e., θ<1. Simple algebra yields φ>
S/R
S−R(1+n).
Additionally, we require some risk sharing to take place, and thus a transfer from
the young to the old to occur at least in some state. The more favorable case for
this transfer to occur is for ω =0 . We hence need to have θ>0. Simple algebra




P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 . 3
For φ ∈ Φ, recall that the time-consistent linear policy function is TP(ω)=
θ + T0ω with θ and T0 deﬁned in proposition 4.2. Notice that we can write
θ =
2(γ − (1 + n))









S − R(1 + n)
. (7.10)























0,s i n c eγR > S and σ>Rimply that γ>2R.







> 0.N o t i c e
that θ c a nb ew r i t t e na s
θ =
φSQ2 + γ (1 − φQR)
φSQ2 +( 1+n)(1− φQR)
(7.11)































P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5 . 1
Comparing the ﬁrst order condition respectively for the benevolent government
(eq. 3.3) and for the politicians (eq. 4.5), we have that, in an interior equilibrium,
the benevolent government and the politicians will adopt the same policy if δ =
φ(1 + (1 + n)T0). Recall that interior equilibrium policies, involving risk sharing
28at least when ω =0 , require respectively, δ ∈ Λ and φ ∈ Φ. Using the expression





¤−1. Furthermore, it is trivial to see that for δ and TG(ω) that solve
the benevolent government problem (for an interior equilibrium), if φ>f(δ),a t
TP(ω)=TG(ω) the ﬁrst order condition of the politicians is negative, so that
TP(ω) <T G(ω).A n dv i c e v e r s af o rφ<f(δ).
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n6 . 1
Recall that, for δ ∈ Λ, the time-consistent linear policy function chosen by the
benevolent government is TG(ωt)=A+Bωt with A and B deﬁn e di np r o p o s i t i o n





δ[S−R(1+n)]2 < 0. Hence,
∂TG(ωt)
∂n < 0.
Recall that for φ ∈ Φ, the time-consistent linear policy function chosen by the
politicians is TP(ω)=θ+T0ω with θ and T0 deﬁned in proposition 4.2. To assess
























s i n c ei ti se a s yt os h o wt h a tt h en u m e r a t o ri sn e g a t i v e .T oc a l c u l a t et h ec h a n g ei n
























φS . Since the denominator is clearly positive, the sign of
∂θ







.T h e n
∂θ
∂n > 0 if
[γ − (1 + n)][S − (1 + n)R] > (γR− S)φSQ
√
∆[φQR − 1]. (7.12)
Using the deﬁnition of θ at eq. 7.10, we have that (γR− S)=
γ−(1+n)
φQ − θ[S −
R(1+n)] <
γ−(1+n)
φQ .T h u s ,as u ﬃcient condition for 7.12 to hold is that [γ −(1+




∆[φQR − 1],t h a ti s ,
[S − (1 + n)R] >S
√
∆[φQR − 1]. (7.13)
29We now show that eq. 7.13 is satisﬁed when TP (ωt) >T G (ωt). First, notice
that S
√
∆[φQR−1] is increasing in φ for φQR > 1.S i n c eTP (ωt) >T G (ωt),f o r
φ<f(δ),w i t hf being increasing in δ,as u ﬃcient condition for eq. 7.13 to hold
is that [S−(1+n)R] is greater than S
√







S − (1 + n)R>
[S − 2(1 + n)2
S
R − (1 + n)
(1 + n)
or rearrenging terms to
(1 + n)S2 − [(1 + n)2R + R − (1 + n)]S +2 ( 1+n)2[R − (1 + n)] > 0.J u s tb y
concentrating on the ﬁrst two terms, it is easy to see that this condition holds,
since S>2R2 and R>(1 + n).














S > 0. Thus, for a given value of δ, aging reduces the
value of φ such that the transfer policy chosen by the politicians is socially opti-
m a l .S i n c eb yp r o p o s i t i o n5 . 1w eh a v et h a tTP(ω) >T G(ω) for φ<f(δ) aging
reduces the set of parameters (φ,δ) such that politicians “overspend”, that is,

















Figure 1: Comparing Intergenerational Risk Sharing 
by a Benevolent Government (G) and by Politicians (P)
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